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A MEMETIC ANALYSIS OF A PHRASE BY BEETHOVEN: CALVINIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON SIMILARITY AND LEXICON-ABSTRACTION 
______________________________ 
1. Similarity in the Light of Evolutionary Theory 
 This article explores certain similarity relationships in music (Cone, 1987; Wiggins, 2007) 
from a cultural-evolutionary perspective, specifically the memetics of Dawkins and others 
(Blackmore, 1999; Dawkins, 1989; Jan, 2007). Memetics is predicated on the idea that units of 
cultural information, memes, share certain properties with units of biological information, 
genes, such that both may be regarded as “replicators” involved in Darwinian processes. It 
regards the most significant similarity relationships as those which arise through meme 
transmission (homology), privileging these over relationships which arise through chance 
resemblance (analogy) (Dennett, 1995, p. 357). In addressing a specific case study, I argue that 
a memetic orientation has the capacity to integrate different perspectives on similarity – 
computational, music-theoretical/analytical, psychological, and neurobiological – under the 
“master-narrative” of Darwinian evolutionary thought. 
 I begin by discussing some general issues arising from the study of similarity in music, both 
human-conducted and computer-aided, and then consider similarity relationships between 
patterns in a phrase by Beethoven, from the first movement of the Piano Sonata in A major 
op. 110 (1821), and various potential memetic precursors. The main purpose of this section is 
to illuminate certain theoretical hypotheses, more than to offer new analytical or aesthetic 
insights into an already extensively discussed composition (see, for instance, Ockelford, 2005). 
I then explore how the kinds of similarity identified in the Beethoven phrase might be 
understood in psychological/conceptual and neurobiological terms, the latter by means of 
William Calvin’s Hexagonal Cloning Theory. I conclude by attempting to map the various 
spaces within which memetic replication occurs. 
2.  Allusions, Musemes, and Listeners 
 Supplementing the manual labors of music theorists and analysts – specifically those who 
examine style from the perspective of “digital”/pattern recurrence as opposed to 
“analogue”/parametric similarity – considerable advances have been made recently in the 
development of pattern-finding software, some under the stimulus of the MIREX competition 
(Cambouropoulos, 1998; Conklin & Anagnostopoulou, 2006; Hawkett, 2013; Huron, 2002; 
Lartillot & Toiviainen, 2007; Lartillot, 2009; “MIREX,” 2014). Cope argues that “referential 
analysis [his own computer-aided process of identifying ‘allusions’ between works] might add 
context to standard analytical approaches” (2003, p. 27). This is on the grounds that the 
resulting “intertextual” (cross-work) listening is potentially richer than what might be termed 
“immured” (work-centric) listening; and it is arguably not in contradiction to the aesthetic 
contemplation most often associated with the latter mode (Dahlhaus, 1982, p. 5). In this sense, 
Cope is in alignment with those strands of musicological thought which maintain that 
seemingly autonomous movements and works are actually highly interconnected, and thus the 
borders which separate them are porous (Korsyn, 1991; Street, 1989). 
 A reorientation of perspective relates intertextual listening to the concerns of this article. 
Instead of an exclusive focus on listeners’ (varied, shifting) experiences of pattern similarity, 
it also considers the attributes of the patterns themselves, and utilizes similarity-finding 
methodologies as a means of tracking their (re)appearance from work to work. Specifically, it 
adopts a Darwinian perspective and considers the allusions as memes (Jan, 2007), using the 
underlying philosophy and methodologies of pattern-finding software to track their 
transmission. 
 The a priori rationale for the memetic approach is that, as a number of “extended/universal-
evolutionary” theorists argue (Dawkins, 1983b; Plotkin, 2010), any system which sustains 
discrete units whose attributes motivate their being copied will almost inevitably tend to boot 
up the evolutionary algorithm (Dennett, 1995, p. 343) and will thus become a “Darwin 
machine” (Calvin, 1996, p. 6) – whether the units are genes, elements of mammalian immune 
systems, or the gestalt-partitioned sound-segments hypothesized here to constitute memes in 
music (hereafter, “musemes”). That Darwinism is a valid way of looking at this aspect of music 
is because it is “not a theory; it is not even an observed fact: it is a tautology” (Dawkins, 1989, 
p. 86). Seen in this way,1 a piece of music is a point of intersection for a number of museme 
lifecycles, connecting “antecedent” to “consequent” copies (or “coindexes”). Those who have 
the capacity to replicate musemes – in “classical” music this is the composer; in other musical 
cultures, the roles of listener, composer, and performer often overlap – assimilate them from 
their culture because certain properties of musemes motivate their copying. In Dawkins’ well 
known formulation, this phenomenon underpins replicators’ metaphorical “selfishness” 
(Dawkins, 1989; Jan, 2007, p. 9). 
 Most psychological accounts of similarity in music are concerned with listeners’ ability to 
detect relationships between musical entities, and this is clearly important for the perception 
and cognition of a piece or style. In Ockelford’s terms, such “zygonic” links create “a sense of 
derivation stemming from one musical element imitating another that is important in creating 
the sense of narrative in music” (2013, p. 16; his emphasis). From the “musemes’ eye view” 
(Blackmore, 2000), however, what matters is that there is a motivation to engender the 
transmission/replication which gives rise to similarities – in Ockelford’s terms (gestalt-
demarcated) group-level zygonic links (2013, p. 136) – across works. This is primarily a 
function of perceptual-cognitive salience, and only secondarily of how (non-composer) 
listeners respond to similarities between patterns. The selfishness of musemes requires that 
consideration of similarity should balance that which interests listeners – those 
intra/intertextual relationships listeners (sometimes) perceive and (sometimes) find significant, 
perhaps partly for genetically motivated reasons – with the interests of musemes – those 
attributes which (sometimes) attract the attention of composers-as-listeners and which thereby 
motivate replication. Memetics arguably offers a forum for this exploration of the “nurtural” 
aspects of listening and their consideration in the same broad terms as those “natural” aspects 
encompassed by evolutionary theory and (evolutionary) psychology. 
 Evidencing all these assertions is beyond the scope of this article and so my objective here 
is the rather more limited one of arriving at a specifically evolutionary analysis of the selected 
phrase in order to explore its musemic structure and hypothetical replication history. If a 
similarity is detected one must consider whether it results from memetic transmission 
(homology), consciously or unconsciously by the composer; or whether it is a fortuitous 
                                                 
1 See (Jan, 2010, pp. 5–8) for a more extended justification for a memetic orientation in music theory and 
music psychology. 
recurrence of the same pattern (analogy). There is often no definitive answer to this question 
but, logically, the longer the replicated segment and the greater the number of shared pitches 
(and, to a lesser extent, rhythms), the greater the likelihood that the relationship is homological 
rather than analogical. Potential quantifications of such conceptual (and therefore potentially 
evolutionary) proximity include the “Earth-Mover’s Distance” metric (Jan, 2014) and 
Ockelford’s measure of “zygonicity,” the latter an index of derivation between two patterns 
and thus of the intentionality to imitate (2013, pp. 37, 256). When such “neutral-level” 
assessments are made with the support of “poietic” knowledge (Nattiez, 1990), our confidence 
in them is enhanced. Nevertheless, while central in cultural-evolutionary terms, the 
analogy/homology distinction may not necessarily impinge significantly upon listeners’ 
perception and cognition of similarity relationships, unless their responses are mediated by 
knowledge of a passage’s provenance, or by a belief (on the grounds of length and mapping) 
that the pattern in question must have had a specific antecedent. 
 In any such attempt to reconstruct the creative process, the analyst-as-listener inevitably 
brings to bear “esthesic” responses (Nattiez, 1990). These are colored by familiarity not only 
with music written before (in this case) Beethoven’s sonata, but also with music written after, 
which may contain musemes copied from those in the Beethoven passage. Whether hearing the 
music in 1821 or in 2015, every listener draws upon a unique musemic inheritance which 
mediates, in complex and sometimes ahistorical ways, the hearing of antecedent and (in modern 
listeners) consequent music. Nor is such hearing ever static in a given individual, changing 
over time as a result of rehearings of a passage and of other music, related or unrelated 
musemically to it (Ockelford, 2013, p. 10). Even if possible, an “archaeological” mode of 
hearing (Byros, 2009) is further complicated by the wider conceptual framework – the “verbal-
conceptual memes” – of an individual or a culture. In the case of the modern “academic” 
listener, this framework includes often conflicting theoretical models which have their own 
evolutionary history and which intersect with listening in myriad ways (Jan, 2011, sec. 4.3.1). 
3. A Memetic Analysis of a Phrase from Beethoven’s Sonata op. 110 
 The kinds of affinities between works I regard as musemes are understood by Cope in terms 
of a continuum linking the five partially overlapping categories of “quotation,” “paraphrase,” 
“likeness,” “framework,” and “commonality” (2003, p. 11; Jan, 2014). These range from the 
direct reproduction of extended segments characterizing quotation to the anonymous examples 
of musical building blocks constituting commonalities (these being equivalent to Narmour’s 
“style shapes” (1990, p. 34)). For memetics, the most common type of replicated pattern folds 
this continuum back on itself, linking quotation with commonality. That is, a large proportion 
of musemes appear to be slightly longer and more salient than the 3–4 element commonalities 
which form the connective tissue of most styles, but they are shorter than the longest (7+-
element) examples of quotations, with all the culturally proscribed implications of plagiarism 
these may carry. They tend to sit in the middle of the <7±2-element “Millerian” constraint-
frame of short-term memory (Miller, 1956; Snyder, 2000). 
 Using these categories as a frame of reference, the closing phrase from the exposition of op. 
110, I, Example 1, has been selected as the analytical object, on account of its motivic richness, 
its clearly demarcated texture, and the clarity of its figuration. As suggested in Section 2, 
undertaking such an analysis necessitates going beyond neutral-level evidence: it encourages 
an attempt to situate oneself at the poietic level in order to try to determine what music 
Beethoven might have known and to understand how he might have manipulated it in the 
passage under investigation. Nevertheless, while the posited antecedent coindexes seem 
neutrally and poietically legitimate, the analogy/homology distinction means that other 
examples might have been the true sources. This proviso is arguably less important than the 
clear probability, on Darwinian grounds, that this music (and music generally) was not created 
de novo and that, accordingly, each meaningful element of its content had an antecedent 
(Ockelford, 2013, pp. 141–142). An exception to this principle is evolutionary “good tricks” 
(Dennett, 1995, p. 77) – obvious solutions (often commonalities), which composers tend 
repeatedly to alight upon independently. 
 Example 1 is divided into six segments or zones, on the basis of changes in texture, 
dynamics, figuration, and register. The component musemes are identified partly on the basis 
of gestalt-psychological segmentation criteria (Deutsch, 1999) and partly on the basis of 
“coindexation-determined segmentation” (Jan, 2011, sec. 4.1.2). That is, patterns are located 
in the literature which match the gestalt-demarcated segments in Beethoven’s phrase. This 
process is conducted by a combination of introspection, using the later version of the pattern 
as a “cue” to recalling earlier forms, and using the Themefinder website (Huron, Kornstädt, & 
Sapp, 2014), identifying potential matches according to the scale-degree sequence of the 
pattern in question. For reasons of space, and because they are considered in subsequent 
sections, only musemes in Zone 1 and one museme in Zone 4 are discussed in detail after 
Example 1. The relationship of the remainder to their hypothesized antecedents will be evident 
from the annotations on Example 1, which functions for these zones rather in the manner of a 
(inter- rather than intra-work) Kellerian wordless “Functional Analysis” (Keller, 2001).2 
Example 1: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in A major op. 110 (1821), I, mm. 23–40 and Hypothesized 
Antecedent Coindexes 
Mx Z1/1A+1B: m. 233–241 
 
 This musemeplex is understood as occupying m. 233–241, being terminated by the closural 
force of the metrically strong event at m. 241 (Narmour, 1990, pp. 11, 219). It contains two 
motions from a I63 chord to a V42, the terminal return to the relatively stable I63 at m. 241 
exerting a further closural force. An antecedent coindex might be read in Mozart’s Concerto 
K. 482, Example 1 ii, the middleground outer-voice line across mm. 51–4 tracing four iterations 
of the I63–V42 motion plus the terminal return to I63, from which Beethoven might be 
hypothesized to have selected a subset. If the Mozart passage is accepted as a valid antecedent 
coindex, then it demonstrates the capacity of musemes to migrate between structural levels, 
moving from being a framework (Mozart) to being a commonality (Beethoven). 
                                                 
2 The hypothesized antecedent coindexes are placed on the smaller staves above and below the Beethoven 
extract. For simplicity, the passage will be taken to be in E major and not the dominant of A. Musemes (“M”) 
are numbered consecutively within each zone (Z1/1A, Z1/2, etc.), and variants are indicated by superscript (Z1/11, 
Z2/3B2, etc.). Numbering of the latter is undertaken on the basis of hypothesized evolutionary sequence with 
respect to posited coindexes and also idiostructural ordering in op. 110, I. The constituent strata of 
“musemeplexes” (“Mx”) – complexes formed from two or more independently replicated musemes – are indicated 
alphabetically (e.g., Z1/1A (upper line), Z1/1B (middle of three or lower line of two), Z1/1C (lower line of three)). 
Their independence is symbolized by “//” on the linking bracket; strata whose bracket is not so marked are non-
independent elements of a single indivisible museme. 
 Mx Z1/2A+1B1: mm. 241–243 
 Mx Z1/2A+1B1 overlaps with Z1/1A+1B, in that the terminal element of the first is the 
initial element of the second (Jan, 2007, p. 74). Mx Z1/1A+1B is perhaps unusual in returning, 
at its third and fifth elements, to the disposition of its first and third. The more normal 
continuation is arguably represented by Mx Z1/2A+1B1, wherein the melodic 2 proceeds to 5 
over the I63 in a strictly three-element structure. Mx Z1/2A+1B1 has at least two coindexes in 
Beethoven’s own music. The first, an antecedent coindex, underpins the theme of the slow 
movement of the Sonata op. 13, Example 1 iii a. The second, a consequent coindex, appears in 
the sketches for the Tenth Symphony, to whose Adagio melody (Cooper, 1985, p. 13) I have 
added an implied harmonization, after op. 13, II, in Example 1 iii b. The op. 13 and symphony 
forms may be evolutionarily prior to that of op. 110, on account of their arguably more 
stable 1–4–3 (Z1/2B) not 3–4–3 (Z1/1B1) bass motion.3 While it is not always possible to 
account for the particular patterns of parataxis exhibited by musemes, Z1/2A+1B1 may have 
been invoked to fill this particular locus by Z1/1A+1B because the two-fold reiteration of the 
I63–V42 motion of Z1/1A+1B creates a strong implication of a further iteration which is realized 
by Z1/2A+1B1. 
 
Mx Z1/3A+3B: mm. 243–252 
 
 Motion in parallel tenths around a sustained 4 tracing the progression IV63–V7 defines Mx 
Z1/3A+3B, which intersects with the rhythmic museme of Z1/1A+1B. The terminal node (final 
element) of Z1/3A+3B is arguably more ambiguous than is the case with Z1/1A+1B. This is 
because whereas the terminal node of Z1/1A+1B (m. 241) is a relatively stable I63 approached 
by downward bass motion from the a of the preceding V42, the analogous point of Z1/3A+3B 
implies further continuation to V7 by virtue of the preceding two-fold repetition of the falling 
bass progression g–f. Both Z1/1A+1B and Z1/3A+3B exemplify the effect of a “musico-
operational/procedural” meme (that is, a replicated idea about how to manipulate musical 
material) which motivates the slowing down of a harmonic progression on its third statement. 
In view of this, the terminal node of Z1/3A+3B is either m. 251 (on accentual grounds) or (as 
is read here) m. 252 (on repetition-habituation grounds). If the latter reading is accepted, 
Beethoven’s museme maps more closely onto its hypothesized antecedent coindex, the passage 
from Le nozze di Figaro in Example 1 iv, which also has three motions from IV63–V7. In 
Beethoven’s passage the b2–a2 motion of m. 243 migrates into the inner voice, as b1–a1, in 
m. 251–2; and the voice-leading of Z1/3A+3B is unparsimonious: whereas its Mozartean 
antecedent renders the progression smoothly in three voices, Beethoven’s four parts 
necessitates either octave doubling of a line or, as here, disjunct inner parts. 
                                                 
3 A distinction must be drawn between chronological and evolutionary priority: a museme or musemeplex x 
(e.g., Z1/2A+2B in Symphony no. 10) might occur in a work which was composed after a work containing 
museme y (e.g., Z1/2A+1B1 in op. 110, I), but x might originally have arisen in (or certainly occurred in) a work 
composed before that containing y (e.g., Z1/2A+2B in op. 13, II). 
 M Z4/1: mm. 311–341 
 
 M Z4/1, appearing in mm. 8–17 of the Overture to Die Zauberflöte, Example 1 xi, consists 
of seven harmonic elements marked a–g. Their function is as follows: a: ii65; b: II65 (V65/V); c: 
V43/IV; d: IV63; e: vii7/V; f: V7; g: I. More fundamentally, the passage articulates a ii/IV–V–I 
progression, the “structural” dominant of which occurs at m. 15 (that at m. 13 is arguably a 
passing harmony within a IV63…vii7/V frame). Essentially the same progression appears in 
mm. 311–341 of Beethoven’s sonata, albeit in a more compressed form: a framework (a 
shallow-middleground level museme generated by foreground-orientated figuration) in Mozart 
becomes a more foreground-orientated museme in Beethoven. 
 Mozart’s element a is rendered in Beethoven at m. 311, the distinctive sound of the ii65 
imparting to his passage the sacerdotal gravity of Sarastro’s temple. Element b follows 
immediately in Beethoven, whereas in Mozart it is deferred by contrapuntal prolongation of 
the ii65. Unlike Mozart’s passage, Beethoven’s element b proceeds to the stylistically more 
normative V of m. 313 and thence to a resolution on the expected local tonic. This segment, 
mm. 313–323, constitutes an intercalated musemeplex, Z4/2A+2B, homologically separate to 
Z4/1. In Mozart, by contrast, there is no resolution on V here, the sidestepping V43/IV of m. 
114, element c, re-energising the subdominant/supertonic prolongation. As a result of the 
transposed repetition of the intercalation in mm. 323–331, element c also occurs in Beethoven, 
on the last semiquaver of m. 32, reaching (in a mirror of Mozart’s rhythmic scheme) the target 
IV on the following strong beat. 
 A diminished seventh chord, element e in Mozart, is a functional analogue to his element b, 
whereas Beethoven’s element e is a simple reiteration of the II65 harmony of his element b. 
Beethoven essentially replays m. 312–3 in m. 332–3, but slight differences between the two 
segments betray the influence of the Mozart passage. The disposition of the dominant seventh 
chord on the final semiquaver of Beethoven’s m. 33 – B, a, d1, b1 – is identical to that of the 
Mozart passage (m. 153, string parts). On its resolution to element g, the upper b1 is repeated 
over the bar line and the d1 resolves, as expected, to e1. This disposition might be understood 
to derive from the Overture’s main Allegro theme, Example 1 xiv, which is orientated to these 
two pitches in mm. 16–17. Thus, Beethoven presents vertically what in Mozart unfolds 
horizontally. 
4. Aspects of the Perception and Conception of Musemes and Lexicons 
 Like all humans, Beethoven was able to memorize yet distinguish between the kinds of 
patterns hypothesized in Example 1, whose various similarities motivate Cope’s concept of the 
“lexicon”. This refers to supersets which encompass a family of similar patterns (2003, p. 20). 
It relates closely to the notion of museme “alleles” (Jan, 2010). Just as a gene allele is an 
“alternative form” of a gene (Dawkins, 1983a, p. 283), a museme allele is a substitute form of 
a museme, one which forms a member of a class related by certain structural or functional 
commonalities. Because of this, one member of the class is able to substitute for another in a 
particular context and still ensure musical coherence. Lexicons are most readily supported by 
Cope’s categories of paraphrase, likeness, and framework, in that these describe sets of patterns 
which are related by similarity of interval, contour, and underlying structure, respectively. 
Discussing this idea using Example 1 as a point of reference, I attempt in this and the following 
section to integrate a memetic perspective, a structural-hierarchical account of similarity, and 
a neurobiological pattern- and lexicon-implementation based upon intersection at various 
hierarchic levels. 
 A lexicon draws together the features of a number of patterns which are perceived or 
conceived as equivalent in some way. Regarded as museme allele-classes, lexicons result from 
the common ancestry of a number of musemes. Two ostensibly separate lexicons may 
“overlap”, owing to similarities between certain of the musemes which instantiate them. It is 
difficult to determine whether this results only from analogical resemblance between particular 
musemes or whether it is the consequence of an earlier lexicon “bifurcation.”4 In the latter case, 
homological lexicon intersection occurs. Using Venn diagrams, Figure 1 i and ii represent these 
situations respectively. 
Figure 1: Lexicon and Museme Intersection 
 Various complications cloud this determination: 
 
 There may be differences between the hierarchic location of musemes, in that two musemes 
which are superficially similar may not in fact share an underlying structural framework, and 
would therefore arguably not belong in the same lexicon.  A lexicon overlap might appear to result from pitch or rhythmic similarity between two 
musemes, but their rhythmic or pitch content, respectively, might be different, arguably placing 
them in separate lexicons.  There may be partial overlaps between, on the one hand, contrapuntal musemeplexes 
consisting of stratified, evolutionarily separate melodic musemes and, on the other hand, 
single-stratum musemes or other musemeplexes. Such stratified complexes can logically 
support only partial overlaps between one or more of their component strata and other (single-
stratum) musemes. They may also support partial overlaps with other musemeplexes, the other 
strata potentially remaining separate. In these various cases there may be either an analogical 
or homological relationship between the overlapping segments. 
 
 One contributory factor to the last of these is the difficulty of making a hard-and-fast 
distinction between harmonic and melodic musemes. When two or more parts move in 
rhythmic unison, have simultaneous initial and terminal museme nodes, and lack melodic 
salience in the lower part(s), it is perhaps more appropriate to speak only of a harmonic 
museme. Where there is more melodic individuality, one might identify two or more melodic 
musemes in contrapuntal combination, plus a resultant harmonic museme (Jan, 2011a). In the 
case of Mx Z1/1A+1B and Z1/2A+1B1, the bass, tenor, and soprano lines appear to have 
sufficient independence and salience to qualify as melodic musemes despite their rhythmic 
synchrony, but for the sake of clarity the middle parts are not labeled as separate musemes in 
                                                 
4 Bifurcation is the splitting of one museme-allele line into two branches. Its (perhaps rarer) opposite, hybrid-
ization, is the (re-)fusion of two formerly evolutionarily separate museme-lines. 
Example 1. These attributes of independence and salience motivate the use of the “//” symbol 
which, as noted, indicates the hypothesis that the upper and lower strata of Z1/1A+1B and 
Z1/2A+1B1 are evolutionarily separate musemes (which, at the risk of circular reasoning, is 
the precondition for describing the structure resulting from their association as a musemeplex). 
 A clear example of overlapping is seen between Z1/1A+1B and Z1/2A+1B1 which, in 
addition to their temporal-sequential elision, manifest a “conceptual” overlap engendered by 
their shared I63–V42–I63 progression and the 3–4–3 bass motion of Z1/1B and Z1/1B1, the latter 
motion metonymically representing the former progression.5 It might be argued, as represented 
in Figure 1 iii, that 
 
 the 3–4–3 bass motion and I63–V42–I63 progression of Z1/1B and Z1/1B1 belong to one 
lexicon, “Lexicon x”; that  the 3–2–3 line of Z1/1A belongs to a second, “Lexicon y”; and that  the 3–2–5 line of Z1/2A belongs to a third, “Lexicon z,” the latter two melodic musemes 
existing in association with a common bass-line/harmonic-progression museme. 
 
 It is nevertheless difficult to determine whether one may properly speak of three separate 
homological-lexical categories overlapping in op. 110 via these particular museme forms. 
There may instead be only two lexicons, Lexicon x/y (Z1/1A+1B) = 3–2–3/I63–V42–I63/3–4–3, 
and Lexicon x/z (Z1/2A+1B1) = 3–2–5/I63–V42–I63/3– 4–3. It may even be the case that there 
are simply three sub-lexicons within a single encompassing lexicon, Lexicon x/y/z 
= 3–2–X/I63–V42–I63/ 3–4–3, as indicated by the outer circle. This determination is complicated 
by the idiostructural context of direct juxtaposition (Z1/1A+1B → Z1/2A+1B1) and the 
processive, mutational nature of such juxtapositions. 
 Showing more complex intersections and overlappings than those represented by Figure 1, 
the Euler diagram in Figure 2 represents the relationships between all the musemes of Example 
1. The latter are given in schematic form in Example 2. Table 1 summarizes the defining 
attributes of each lexicon. Fourteen lexicons are posited here, but other groupings of musemes 
(and therefore different numbers and configurations of lexicons) are of course possible. The 
defining attributes of lexicons are understood as specific pattern content, expressed in terms of 
interval and scale-degree sequence or harmonic progression, and not more abstract, conceptual 
qualities, such as contour or uncontextualized pitches (e.g., “contains an A”). 
Example 2: Summary of Musemes and Musemeplexes in Example 1 
 
Figure 2: Lexicon Intersection in Example 1 
                                                 
5 The additional iteration of the progression in Z1/1B as against Z1/1B1 is discounted for the sake of argument. 
Of course, this difference in museme components may itself motivate a different reading of lexicon membership, 
indicating how fluid and nuanced such determinations are. 
 Table 1: Attributes of Lexicons in Figure 26 
5. Aspects of the Neurobiological Implementation of Musemes and Lexicons 
 I now turn to the issue of how musemes and lexicons are implemented in the brain in order 
to relate the spatial representations of Figure 1 and Figure 2 to what is currently known about 
the neural encoding of musical information. William Calvin’s Hexagonal Cloning Theory 
(“HCT”) (Calvin, 1996, 1998) offers a robust mechanism for the neocortical implementation 
of musemes and lexicons and thus may account for significant aspects of the perception, 
cognition, and generation of music. While a full account of the HCT is beyond the scope of 
this article, its claims support evidence concerning the perception and cognition of music, 
including similarity and lexical relationships (for a more detailed account, see Jan, 2011, from 
which some passages below are adapted). Calvin argues that “minicolumns” of neurons (1996, 
p. 205) responding to a particular input pitch will excite near-neighboring minicolumns such 
that monotonal triangular arrays will be formed over the surface of the auditory cortex (1996, 
p. 34). A museme consists of a series of such arrays in a “spatiotemporal firing pattern” (“SFP”) 
(1996, p. 47). The most parsimonious geometric arrangement of these “interdigitating” (1996, 
pp. 118, 179), temporally coordinated arrays is the hexagon, virtual structures overlaid on real 
patterns of triangular-array excitation. The “cloning” of hexagons across the surface of cortex 
in response to an incoming stimulus or elicited memory motivates the emergence of the percept 
or memory into conscious awareness (1996, p. 45). 
 Hexagonal cloning drives Darwinian competition between rival hexagons, the “winning” 
configuration representing the closest fit between incoming data and extant encodings. The 
latter – our long-term memories of music and thus the most fundamental form of musemes – 
are preserved by durable patterns of neuronal connectivity related by Calvin to the “attractors” 
of chaos theory. Like a depression on an otherwise smooth surface, these draw the elements of 
an incoming pattern towards specific array vertices (1996, p. 68). Many configurations of 
attractors might be “burned” into the same region of cortex, forming virtual strata likened by 
Calvin to the thin, overlapping layers of fish in the Japanese delicacy sashimi (1996, p. 107). 
 More recent work in this area has concerned spatial representation using the “grid cells” of 
the entorhinal cortex (Burak & Fiete, 2009; Killian, Jutras, & Buffalo, 2012; Shrager, Kirwan, 
& Squire, 2008; Stensola et al., 2012). These are thought to be implicated in positional location 
in two-dimensional space and, like certain other brain systems, map incoming dimensional data 
systematically onto cortical neurons. While such studies tend not to make explicit reference to 
the HCT (but see Garliauskas & Šoliūnas, 2000), and while some even considerably predate 
Calvin’s work (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971), the cells they describe also form triangular 
arrays which are similarly grouped into hexagonal plaques (Fuhs & Touretzky, 2006, p. 4269, 
Figure 2). The field of research these studies describe, in conjunction with Calvin’s work, may 
be argued to theorize a broadly unified approach to the encoding of certain types of sensory 
data, one where the systematic mapping of real-world space to the geometry of the cortical 
                                                 
6 The falling fourth-progressions of L10 are bracketed in Example 2. Such subdivisions of longer pitch se-
quences require gestalt support to exist as viable musemes. As shown in Example 2, a third category of fourth-
progression,↓1–↓2–↓2, might be read in Z2/1B. 
surface might also encompass the mapping of more abstract spaces including those engendered 
by pitch. 
 There are two aspects to the application of the HCT to musemes and lexicons. The first 
concerns the encoding of foreground-level musemes and the lexicons which encompass them; 
the second concerns the implementation of the higher-order abstractions which relate musemes 
within lexicons and lexicons to other lexicons. Before exploring these aspects, it is worth noting 
that what is discussed below is a relatively circumscribed area of a much wider network of 
relationships. That is, the account focuses upon the fundamental mechanics of musical 
information storage as hypothesized by the HCT. It does not, for reasons of space, go into detail 
on certain related issues, all of which appear readily accountable for by Calvin’s theory. These 
include the motor actions motivated by musical patterns which underpin musical performance 
(Jan, 2011, sec. 2, Table 1; Leman, 2008), and the verbal-conceptual memes associated with 
purely musical information as part of the semiotic content of music (Jan, n.d.). 
 Figure 3 hypothesizes how the lexicon configurations in Figure 1 iii might be implemented 
in the cortex. Triangles colored red are active (firing) and those colored blue are “silent.”7 
H[exagon]1 represents Z1/1B and Z1/1B1 ((Sub-)lexicon x), including inner voices/implied 
harmony. H2 and H3 represent, respectively, the melodic musemes Z1/1A ((Sub-)lexicon y) 
only and Z1/2A ((Sub-)lexicon z) only. H4 represents the lexicon encompassing H1–H3 
(Lexicon x/y/z). It also represents – to identify other alleles – the opening motive of the 
Allegretto of Beethoven’s “Moonlight” Sonata (Example 3 i), transposed to E major, provided 
the c2 array (shown dotted red) is firing; and a figure from the first movement of Beethoven’s 
Piano Concerto no. 4 (Example 3 ii), similarly transposed. In both perception and recollection, 
the cortical substrate of these musemes is hypothesized to consist of a sequential movement 
through specific patterns of array activation. 
Figure 3: Calvinian Implementation of Figure 1 iii 
 
Example 3: Musemes in Figure 3 
i) Beethoven: Piano Sonata in C minor op. 27 no. 2 (“Moonlight”) (1802), II, mm. 03–21 
 
ii) Beethoven: Piano Concerto no. 4 in G major op. 58 (1805), I, mm. 157–8 
 
 
                                                 
7 The minicolumnar grid is taken from http://williamcalvin.com/Demo2.htm (accessed 27 November 2014). 
While not intended to represent the precise topographic organization of the auditory cortex, it assumes that its 
surface is systematically “tuned” to pitch, with sufficient receptor repetition and interdigitation to allow hexagons 
to encompass the same pitch class in different octaves and in different configurations. 
 The same sequence of pitch or the same pitch content might give rise to two separate 
musemes on account of rhythmic differences, as in the case of Z1/1B and Z1/1B1. Calvin 
distinguishes between spatial-only (semantic memory) and spatiotemporal (episodic memory) 
patterns (1996, p. 65; Snyder, 2000, p. 108), implying that the primary parameter encoded by 
arrays is pitch, and that rhythm is an emergent property resulting from firing-order. Whereas 
the firing-order in perception and cognition is a response to incoming stimuli, in memory it is 
an artifact of the interaction between “initial conditions” and attractor embedding (1996, p. 66). 
A set of stimulus cues – perhaps the previously heard or recalled museme – may activate the 
arrays for a specific pitch museme to fire in a variety of patterns, defined by the progress of the 
activation down a range of possible sashimi-paths from attractor to attractor to the stasis of the 
lowest stratum. These paths constitute the memories of specific durational, accentual, or inter-
onset-interval configurations defining a range of co-adapted rhythmic musemes. 
 Intersecting hexagons in Figure 3 represent overlaps between elements in certain parameters 
at various points of two or more musemes, implemented as shared triangular arrays straddling 
musemes. Ignoring rhythm, the pitch intersection set H1/(S-)lxH2/(S-)lyH3/(S-)lz is the 
six-pitch melodic-harmonic sequence 2–3|5/V42–I63/4– 3, boxed in Example 1 and Example 3.8 
It links all alleles, and so the presence of this SFP (“S” here representing spatial, not 
spatiotemporal) constitutes the defining criterion for membership of the lexicon encompassed 
by H4. Two or more musemes within a lexicon may share one or more arrays which, unlike 
those at H1H2H3, are not common to all members of the lexicon, this being a candidate 
cortical analogue for the phenomenon of the sub-lexicon. This situation might occur in the 
context of alleles containing the pattern enclosed by the dotted box in Example 3 i, with its 
characteristic 6/c2, a pitch absent in H1H2H3. 
 The layout of Figure 3, if replicated in cortex, suggests that numerous (sub-)lexicons may 
occupy the same region of cortex, being distinguished only by their particular SFPs. While 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent patterns as to some extent distinct and topographically separate, 
Figure 3 suggests that a variety of patterns are spatially coexistent in the connectivity, awaiting 
activation. Whether Z1/1A, Z1/2A, and Z1/1B and Z1/1B1 are regarded as separate lexicons or 
as sub-lexicons depends in part on the size of the encompassing hexagon, on the number of 
“voices” it includes, and on the particular SFPs of the incorporated arrays. As with intersection 
within lexicons, that between lexicons (represented in Figure 1 ii and iii) arises through array 
interdigitation: elements constituting a museme or sub-lexicon in one lexicon might be 
common to a museme or sub-lexicon in another, in which case the two lexicons partially 
overlap as a result of hexagonal straddling. It appears likely that the majority of lexicons are 
connected via such partial intersections, and so the museme intersection within a lexicon 
creating sub-lexicons is replicated, at a recursively higher level, by intersection between 
lexicons. 
 This property arguably attenuates the conceptual and cortical distinctions between lexicons 
and sub-lexicons, and between lexicons and other lexicons. In cortex such distinctions – and 
thus the categories they represent – appear to be fuzzy. Moreover, the Calvinian 
implementation of a pattern does not appear contingent upon its provenance. The analogy-
homology distinction does not appear to have a direct cortical equivalent, so whilst 
evolutionarily very significant, and while potentially relevant to listeners, it is not “written 
                                                 
8 The 5 (b2) does not occur as a melodic pitch in every allele, but is nevertheless present (as b1/b) in all. 
into” the cortex at the level of topographical museme/lexicon implementation. The brain’s 
priority appears to be parsimonious pattern encoding, not with charting a particular individual’s 
necessarily limited impression of memetic-evolutionary history. 
 Cognition of similarity between musemes within a lexicon appears contingent upon 
abstraction of the underlying similarities between superficially different pattern-instantiations, 
which also appears to underpin a number of other music-psychological phenomena, including 
the features-schemata dualism (Gjerdingen, 1988, 2007; Leman, 1995) and, therefore, Cope’s 
notion of frameworks. This is implemented by the principle of “hashing,” where an abstracted 
“message digest” acts as a “unique short-form identifier … of something more complicated” 
(Calvin, 1996, pp. 17, 207). Prominent and defining attributes which qualify a set of similar 
patterns for membership of a lexicon – the intersection set containing those elements common 
to all musemes within it, such as the pattern at H1H2H3 in Figure 3 – are copied to a 
“centrally-located category representation” (“CLR”) (Calvin, 1996, p. 135). Abstraction is 
accomplished by what Calvin terms “faux-fax” links connecting certain analogous arrays from 
hexagons in different regions of cortex to matching arrays of higher-level “index hexagons” 
(1996, pp. 125, 131). 
 Figure 4 (after Jan, 2011, Figure 14) hypothesizes a mechanism for this process. The NE, 
NW, and SE quadrants encompass representations of three lexicons, A, B, and C, within each 
of which are three musemes, Ax, Ay, and Az, etc., each represented as a group of three 
hexagonal tiles. The arrays of each allele are shown in various different colors; the identical set 
of colors employed in each allele is not intended to suggest that each has exactly the same 
pitch-class content as its co-alleles. The SW quadrant encompasses the CLR(s), wherein those 
pitches of the musemes constituting each lexicon occupying all-member intersection sets 
(represented by a three-note subset of the arrays) are abstracted by the higher-order 
representations, each shown as a group of three hexagonal tiles. 
Figure 4: Calvinian Implementation of Hierarchic Lexical Abstraction 
 This model is “vertical”/hierarchic, in that patterns stored in a CLR are not only a cognitive 
but also a musico-structural abstraction, however one theorizes this (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 
1983; Schenker, 1979). The pitches constituting lexicon-defining intersection sets and sub-
lexicons tend to be the structural frameworks of their associated musemes: they are often 
important triadic and/or scalic pitches situated in strong metric positions and tightly connected 
by implication-realization forces (Narmour, 1990), and so are privileged acoustically and 
perceptually (Deliège, 2001). Such intersection sets intrinsically imply a degree of reduction, 
and the differences between intersecting and non-intersecting museme-elements represent if 
not a structural-hierarchic ladder then certainly an Einsteinian spatial curvature of the lexicon, 
which flags these privileged pitches for abstraction. Note that the “recursively higher level” 
referred to above in connection with Figure 3 and (sub-)lexicon intersection is defined by 
reference to “horizontal” expanse, not the pitch-structural selection characteristic of the higher 
levels of vertical abstraction. 
 The latter process appears multiply recursive: there may be several progressively more 
abstract levels of indexation, corresponding to increasingly remote musico-structural levels. At 
these higher levels there may be input from conceptual thought: while abstraction of lower-
level patterns might be driven by bottom-up forces, that of higher-level features may involve 
the intercession of top-down verbal-conceptual memes. Recursivity is represented in Figure 4 
by the faux-fax links converging on Ax, intended to suggest that quadrants A, B, and C (≈ “sub-
foreground”; level 3 ≈ level 3 in Example 1) themselves represent abstractions of patterning at 
a lower level (≈foreground; level 2/4); and also by those leaving from the CLR (≈ shallow-
middleground; level 4 ≈ level 2 in Example 1) to connect to a still higher-level representation 
(≈ deeper middleground; level 5 ≈ notional level 1 in Example 1), perhaps one which abstracts 
structural aspects common to a number of CLR hexagons. The latter may themselves be 
organized into lexicons because similar higher-level structures might be abstracted from a 
variety of lower-level lexicon-sets. CLR lexicons might also intersect horizontally in the same 
ways as those at lower levels, as represented by the overlappings shown on Figure 4. The 
potentially large number of indexation levels implies there is a quasi-analogue progression in 
the vertical “plane” analogous to that linking lexicons in the horizontal. 
 Museme Z4/1 offers a concrete example of hierarchic abstraction. The Mozart and 
Beethoven passages, while very different in their foreground musemic content (the level (2/4) 
below that (3/3) of structures in quadrants A–C), are abstractable to the underlying ii65–II65–
V43/IV–IV63–vii7/V–V7–I framework situated at level 3/3. At the sub-3/3 level, several non-
shared musemes might be identified, such as the rising fourth-progression b1–c2–d2–
e2/5–6–7–1 (Mozart, mm. 53–4), the semiquaver triadic figures e2–c2–a1 and f2–d2–b1 
(Mozart, m. 54), the falling fourth-progression b1–a1–g1–f1/5–4–3–2 (Beethoven, m. 33), and 
the dotted-rhythm perfect cadence (Beethoven, mm. 33–4), shown enclosed by dotted boxes in 
Example 1. While not a common pattern, other instantiations of the level-3/3 museme may 
exist, generated by different level-2/4 musemes. At the level (4/2) of the CLR, a linearly and 
harmonically coherent subset of the level-3/3 framework – perhaps ii65–II65–V7–I, or even the 
diatonic ii65–V7–I – might be indexed. This may conceivably occupy a lexicon consisting of 
patterns whose analogies may arise from different lower-level homologies. 
6. Mapping Musemes in Cultural, Idiostructural, and Cortical Space 
 I have argued that the selfish m(us)eme is reducible to the hexagonal collection of triangular 
arrays constituting Calvin’s “cerebral code”. Once it has conquered sufficient cortical territory 
by Darwinian force, this cluster of synchronized neuronal minicolumns is able to motivate its 
host to produce “phemotypic” (extra-somatic) equivalents of the “memotypic” (brain-level) 
SFP, which facilitate its further transmission (Jan, 2007, p. 30, Table 2.1). Despite the relatively 
limited range of tonal materials in all musical systems, the “Humboldtian” richness of music 
(Merker, 2002) allows not only for a great diversity of patterning but also for miscopying, and 
with it a multitude of lexical relationships. These extend horizontally (via intersection) and 
vertically (via indexation), flooding musemic space with the differential similarity relationships 
which create coherence and comprehensibility in music. 
 Musemic propagation occurs within and between a number of spaces: the cultural 
(analogous to Meyer’s dialect (1996, p. 23)); the idiostructural (the sequences of musemes in 
works); and the cortical (the locus of the most fundamental memetic processes). These might 
be regarded as cultural equivalents to the intra-work foreground, middleground, and 
background levels, respectively. Figure 5 represents the relationships which obtain between 
each space. Musemes are represented by hexagons and lexicons by circles; solid arrows 
represent intra-brain or brain-work relationships between musemes and dotted arrows represent 
intra-work or work-work relationships. 
Figure 5: Museme Flows across Cortical, Idiostructural, and Cultural Space 
 Arrow group 1(a–d) represents memetic transmission of a hexagon (memotype) from one 
cortex to another, via a musical work (phemotype). The third stage of this process (1c) need 
not be realized: a museme might be copied into a second cortex, but not be expressed 
phemotypically as part of an idiostructure – although without such expression it is difficult to 
verify, at a historical distance, whether transmission occurred. The dotted arrow (1d) represents 
the intertextual reappearance of a pattern from one work in another. Group 2(a–f) represents 
mechanisms underpinning lexical similarities between musemes within cortices and within 
works. These may derive from intra-cortical transmission/mutation (2a, 2b); from copying from 
other cortices (2d–f); or they may result from analogical similarities (2g). The intra-
idiostructural dotted arrow here (2c) represents connections between musemes as they unfold 
in works but, as implied apropos 2d–f, these may actually arise externally. Group 3(a–f) 
represents the manifestation of relationships described by groups 1 and 2 within culture (i.e., 
the sum of all idiostructures). This level encompasses perceived lexical similarities between 
(as opposed to within) works (3d). Wrapping torus-like back to the cortical level, culture feeds 
back to the cortical level (3f), doing so via the idiostructural (3e): the wider m(us)eme-pool is 
manifested not abstractly but concretely, via specific cultural products. 
 How is this process initiated for an individual?9 While not necessarily in contradiction to an 
empiricist perspective on learning, an important facet of columnar theories of neocortical 
function is their contention that “humans start with some basic structure … in the brain around 
the time of birth, giving rise to a huge repertoire of inherent spatial-temporal firing patterns” 
(Leng & Shaw, 1991, p. 252). This implies that the neonate brain has the neuronal foundation 
for all possible m(us)emes already provisionally laid out in its connectivity, and that 
enculturation reifies these inherent possibilities, initiating a lifelong process of assimilating, 
categorizing, and indexing musemes. With a normal complement of 1010 neurons linked by 
1014 synapses this seems eminently feasible (Leng & Shaw, 1991, p. 241, Fig. 7). In this sense 
the neonate cortex is, in Borges’ terms, a potential “Library of Babel,” a “multimemetic 
hypervolume” (after Dawkins, 1991, p. 67), encompassing all possible m(us)emes in all 
possible lexical arrangements and awaiting the activation and attractor embedding induced by 
environmental stimulation (Jan, 2007, p. 196). To paraphrase Borges, “the cortex is total and 
its gyri and sulci register all the possible chunk-sized combinations of the twelve pitch classes 
and rhythmic patterns (a number which, though extremely vast, is not infinite): in other words, 
all that it is given to express in all musics” (1970, pp. 81–82). 
 One possible visualization of a minuscule region of such a hypervolume is shown in Figure 
6. Three musemes from Example 1 are represented on the y axis (“right-handed” orientation). 
Their constituent loci (temporal-sequential slots) are shown on the x axis, and the specific 
values at each locus (here pitch class, represented by the integer scale) are indicated on the z 
axis. The elliptical circles represent lexical relationships between the musemes (lexicon labels 
correspond to those in Figure 2 and Table 1). Constraints of the two-dimensional page prevent 
the representation of a fully multidimensional hypervolume, in which more than one value at 
each locus could be indicated. Represented minimally, the SFP of a cortical hexagon appears 
as a series of interconnected points in multidimensional space; represented more richly, it 
                                                 
9 The question of how it began at the level of the human species has been addressed by several commentators 
(see, for instance, Blackmore, 2000, p. 31; Mithen, 2006; Wallin, Merker, & Brown, 2000). 
would appear as a multi-angular lamella, multiply intersecting with other such lamellae within 
the hypervolume. 
Figure 6: Three Musemes in a Multimusemic Hypervolume 
 To summarize the issues considered here, we might reimagine Dawkins’ definition of the 
meme – “a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation” (1989, p. 192; his emphasis) – 
by integrating it with the HCT. At the memotypic level, a m(us)eme can be defined as 
a replicator existing as a sound/image/concept-encoding SFP embedded as a series of attractors in 
the underlying minicolumnar connectivity of the cortex by recurrent excitation resulting from sen-
sory or motor input and capable of colonizing large areas of cortex (and of other brains’ cortices) 
according to Universal-Darwinian principles of replication, variation, and selection. It aligns par-
tially with other SFPs in the ‘Library of Aristoxenus’ (Jan, 2007, p. 201), such that lexical associa-
tions relate and connect the discrete and particulate into a wider continuum of similarity, transmis-
sion, context, and meaning relationships across cortical, idiostructural, and cultural space. 
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